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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IHC HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. 
d/b/a LDS HOSPITAL, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
V o . 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Case No. 200440487-CA 
REVIEW FROM AGENCY DECISION BY UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
DECISION NO. 03-224-22 
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The parties are accurately and completely identified in the caption. 
JURISDICTION 
The Petitioner appeals from a final agency order issued pursuant to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding in the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-2(a) and id. at § 63-46b-16 (2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/ STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Because LDS Hospital (the Hospital) failed to provide the Presiding Officer 
with legal authority or legal analysis regarding its failure to comply with the express 
terms of the agreement with Molina, did it fail to preserve the issue for appeal? 
Failure to preserve an issue for appeal is a matter decided in the first instance by 
the appellate court. Thus, there is no standard of review. 
2. Because the Hospital merely reiterates certain facts asserted below and does 
not provide legal analysis or argument in support of its position, has the Petitioner 
adequately briefed the issue consistent with the requirements of Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
Adequacy of briefing is a matter decided in the first instance by the appellate court. 
Thus, there is no standard of review. 
3. Because the Hospital has failed to marshal any evidence to challenge the 
finding by the Presiding Officer that the final hospital admission was not emergency care, 
can the Petitioner assert on appeal that the care was emergent? 
Adequacy of marshaling is a matter decided in the lirst instance by the appellate 
court. Thus, there is no standard of review. 
4. Does the Hospital's belief that there was other insurance available at the time 
of the final admission excuse its failure to comply with the plain language of the contract 
and related documents? 
2 
The interpretation of contract terms is a question of law and reviewed for 
; • : i t: ecti less. U \ >st I \ illey City i A 1 < u tin, 2004 I It; ti: i > { \\ 32 ) | 11 ( ' - * t i. ill : • : \ I ' ; , 
interpretation of the terms of an unambiguous, integrated contract, presents a question of 
law and is reviewed for correctness on appeal"). 
Does the failure of the Petitioner to marshal evidence in support ,;i
 wie 
The decision of the agency may be challenged based upon a determination of fact, 
nla ie or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed 
ill • - - ; *• »p|». 
2003). 
Adequacy of marshaling is a matter decided in the first instance by the appellate 
court. Thus, there is no standard ol review. 
S I A I L I Lh, KULLS, lUlNS t ITUTIOINAL PROVISIONS 
The full text of the following relevant statutes and rules is included in Addendum 
B: Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24. 
S I A I I L I M E M U I I H E C A ^ L 
i !)S H..-P- '* ^osnitnl1'in I Pr?p:;ir\ ('hi Wrens Hospital (PCH) provided 
services to Keyonte Pittman, a Medicaid recipient, from July 22, 2002 through October 
29, 2002. The services involved three separate admissions to i i )S I lospital and two 
admissions i ' • «-i ; : ; ; . i . tu ; ^ i \ \m • ^ i c d i u i s ' ! i i i a i i a u i u \ , "
 b 
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the first two LDS Hospital admissions and paid for both the PCH admissions. Molina 
declined to pay for the final admission to the Hospital from August 19, 2002 through 
October 29, 2002 because the Hospital failed to obtain authorization for that admission. 
Molina reviewed the initial determination and upheld the decision not to pay. The 
Hospital appealed the matter to the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing for a formal hearing as part of the Medicaid fair hearing process. The Presiding 
Officer issued a recommended order upholding the determination not to pay. The order 
was affirmed by the agency. (R. 189-197). A petition for review was filed on June 11, 
2004. (R. 206). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tawnee Chamberlain was admitted to LDS Hospital (The Hospital) on July 20, 
2002 and gave birth to Keyontae Pittman on July 22, 2002 in the Hospital. (R. 31-77, 
159). The child was born with a serious medical condition. During the course of 
treatment, the child had five discrete hospital admissions, including two separate periods 
at Primary Children's Hospital (PCH) and three at LDS Hospital. The final discharge was 
from LDS Hospital. The time periods were as follows: LDS Hospital from July 22, 2002 
to July 26, 2002 for which there was no authorization; PCH from July 26, 2002 to July 30, 
2002 for which there was no authorization1; LDS Hospital from July 30, 2002 to August 
1
 Medicaid rules do not require authorization for emergency care. 42 CFR § 
438.114 (2003). Thus, the initial admissions in this case did not require that The Hospital 
obtain authorization for the birth and delivery. The Presiding Officer's finding that the 
final admission was not emergency care moves it outside the scope of this provision. 
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14, 2002 for which there was no authorization, in i \ iioni August h I, 2002 to t "Vugiist 19, 
29, 2002 for which there was no authorization Molina paid for the first four admissions. 
(R, 96). It is the denial of payment for the last admission to LDS Hospital that is the 
c
':::jeu K-A this appeal. 
!
 '•..• '' .lmi^i<>n in . •• \ ii-;trd Molina Health Care as a secondary insurer 
from the time of the initial admission on July 22, 2002 through the end of treatment on 
October 29, 2002. (R. 178), 
were subject to the provisions of Utah Administrative Rule 414-1-33, The Medicaid 
Provider Manual (R. 21), and the contract between IHC Hospitals and Molina Her1"1 
Care (K. LL-L^). i he i,Uil. Medicaid t ' luudu Manual suue. ..._ .. .,-ncaiaj pu 
• r*.t .. .- vcoivr reimbursement" 
(R. 20). 
LDS Hospital did not obtain the required authorization at any time during the 
seventy-two day admission dial j , lln i ultfu I <>l lln • appeal I1"1' ' " did <»I>1JIII 
authorization from Molina on August 15, 2002, (R H ! ^). LDS Hospital , like P C H is a 
Medicaid provider and so was required to obtain inpatient authorization from Molina 
Health Care in order to qualify for Medicaid payment for the admission from August . (>., 
2/0031 1 ' • n igl LOC t< )1 >ei 29. .2/002 (f 21) 
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As the Presiding Officer found, there is no dispute that the services were medically 
necessary. It is also undisputed that the services provided during the final admission did 
not qualify as emergency care. (R. 193). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Presiding Officer properly determined that The Hospital had not authorized 
with Molina Health Care for the final admission from August 19, 2002 through October 
29, 2003 and therefore was not entitled to payment from Molina. The Medicaid Provider 
Manual (Addendum C), Utah Administrative Rule 414-1-13 (Addendum 2) and the 
contract between the Hospital and Molina (R. 22-23) all require that the Hospital comply 
with the authorization requirements for payment through Molina and the Hospital failed 
to do so. The Hospital has offered no reason why the contract provisions should not 
apply to this particular case. 
In any event, the Hospital asserts no issues on appeal that can be properly 
addressed by this court. First, The Hospital failed to preserve the issues for appeal by 
failing to articulate any legal theory to the tribunal below regarding the non-applicability 
of the express requirements of the various agreements between Molina and the Hospital, 
and it failed to provide citations to any legal authority in support of its position. 
Second, the issues on appeal are inadequately briefed, providing no legal reasoning 
in support of the Hospitals position and likewise failing to provide even a barebones 
citation to any legal authority in support of its position. 
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Third, The Hospital asserts that the J Hidings ofthe Presiding Officer are not 
that they first marshal all evidence in support of the finding to then challenge the 
sufficiency of the finding. 
Fourth, the Hospital attempts to cnaiienge a specuu . ...aing i . i , vc 
Officer 1:1: lat tl: le care pi ov ided di u it ig tl: le last admission was not emergency care. Aeain, it 
failed to marshal any evidence in support of the finding. Instead, the Hospital simply 
asserts that the care was emergent, despite a specific finding b> the 1'iesiding Ollieer that 
Because The Hospital failed to preserve the issues for appeal and has not 
adequately briefed the issues raised on appeal, the agency's order should be affirn 
l i I E P E T I T I O N E R 4A1JL&1, MJFSFH \ ' E ' IIIE ISSl JES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but rather, must be raised at 
the Agency level. Issues not properly raised at trial are usually deemed waive,;. ; ;\** 
was adequately raised before the tribunal: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely 
fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Badger \. isi ooKiyii L aiu*. L ..•. -'oc-
8 4 4 .;/*. Hmnl^uh " ' '. / / H / U / ' • / \ r / > A - \ 4 S ^ M < ) ^ 
7 
(Utah 2002). Properly raising the issue requires more than a "mere mention of the issue 
in the pleadings," Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 
1997) cert denied, 953 P.2d449 (Utah 1997). 
The Hospital has failed to meet both the second and third prong of the test. The 
Hospital does not dispute the validity of the requirement for authorization as set forth in 
the Medicaid Manual. However, it failed at the hearing level to raise any specific 
argument as to why the authorization requirements should not be applied in this case, nor 
did it provide any legal authority or argument supporting its position. The Hospital 
provided nothing more than a general assertion that it was impossible to perform the 
required acts and, without even using the terms, they hinted at some vague theory of 
waiver or estoppel. The latter do not even qualify as a "mere mention" in the hearing 
below. The argument of impossibility is meritless on its face given that PHC did, in fact, 
comply with the authorization requirement with the same information available to them as 
was available to LDS Hospital. Thus, it would be necessary for the Petitioner to offer 
evidence or legal authority as to why it was somehow in a different position from PCH. It 
made no such showing in the hearing. 
The Hospital has also failed to present any grounds for reviewing these issues that 
were not preserved below. Rule 24 (a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that the Petitioner present "grounds for reviewing any issues not preserved in the trial 
court, with the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." The Petitioner has 
8 
provided no such argument nor any citation to relevant legal authority supporting 
inclusion 01 issues not p iopu r :di>c\i 1^ 1 ^ -
THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MEET I HE REQUIREMENTS 
OF RULE 24 (a)(9), BY INADEQUATELY BRIEFING THE 
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
24 (aH^* u\ (IK i <u*n .N,m ^ AppUlaiv. 1'iocedure requires mat me Petitioner 
. . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
" equate briefing requires "not just bald citation to authority but development of that 
- only and reasoned analysis based on lUiii Liuiiiiii ii •» Miift \ moiihi,, l»n i i M jMl), 
^04 • | <,)< n i) Brrausr The I f ospital has failed to adequately brief the issues, the 
decision below should be affirmed. Id. ("It is well established that a reviewing court will 
not address arguments that are inadequately bnekxi. ) 
issues on appeal. They have provided no "reasoned analysis" supporting their claims and 
have failed even to provide a "bald citation to authority." The Hospital has merely 
reiterated facts regarding then aucnipL, k; a^ai n i .v., . ..; ...i . .: JI ^n ,n .in> 
le^a* : — * • < .' .: . , us. tlui fnlvv ? btain authorization from 
Molina. This simply does not meet the minimum requirements of Rule 24 (a)(9). 
9 
III. LDS HOSPITAL HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE THE 
FINDINGS OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER. 
During the hearing before the agency, the Hospital asserted that the full seventy 
plus day final admission was emergency care and thus required no authorization. (R. 10-
12, 17-18). The Presiding Officer made an explicit finding that the hospital admission at 
issue in this appeal was not urgent or emergent. (R. 193). The Hospital challenges this 
finding by repeatedly asserting in the appeal that the admission in question was, in fact, 
emergency care. (R. 7, 9). A party "challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(9). In the instant case, The Hospital has failed to marshal evidence of 
any kind regarding the finding regarding emergency care. Because The Hospital failed to 
marshal the evidence regarding the finding should not be disturbed. Chen v Stewart, 2004 
UT 82, \ 80 ("If appellants have failed to properly marshal the evidence, we assume that 
the evidence supports the trial courts's findings."). 
IV. THE HOSPITALS BELIEF THAT THE PATIENT WAS COVERED 
BY ANOTHER INSURER IN ADDITION TO MOLINA DOES NOT 
EXCUSE ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS FOR 
AUTHORIZATION. 
The findings of the Agency should not be upset by a reviewing court if they are 
supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole. Zissi v. Utah State 
Tax Comm 'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). Substantial evidence is the quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support the 
10 
conclusion. First Nat'I Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990). In the present case, the plain language of the contract and the incorporated 
documents requires that LDS Hospital obtain authorization from Molina for the final 
hospital admission in order to qualify for payment. See Addenda C and D The Hospital 
did not obtain such authorization. Other hospitals complied with the requirement, and the 
Petitioner failed to provide any credible legal support to excuse its non-compliance with 
the contract. There is substantial evidence supporting the findings. 
In any event, the challenge to the finding is not properly taken. In order to 
challenge the Agency's findings, the Petitioner must show that the findings are "not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court" Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (2003). This showing requires that the 
Petitioner first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and show that "in spite of 
the supporting facts...the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Grace 
Drilling Co. v Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). The Petitioner has 
failed to marshal any of the supporting evidence and has simply restated, without legal 
analysis, the assertions that they thought someone else was going to pay. Absent the 
proper marshaling of evidence the findings should not be disturbed. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. v Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 839 P.2d 841, 848 
("Because IHC failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the ALJ's findings, 
we decline to disturb those findings as ratified by the Industrial Commission.") 
11 
The fundamental argument made by LDS Hospital in the agency hearing and 
repeated here is that they believed the child was covered by another insurer, IHC Health 
Plans, thus they could not have known to confirm coverage. They also speculate that they 
could not have confirmed coverage through Molina because there was no coverage. This 
is neither accurate nor relevant. As the Hospital's own records show, Molina was listed 
as a secondary insurer. (R, 167), A careful reading of the evidence shows that for the full 
period of treatment LDS Hospital never bothered to check with Molina regarding 
eligibility. 
It is important to note that LDS Hospital's sister hospital, PCH, had precisely the 
same information regarding potential coverage with IHC Plus and Molina during this 
same time period. PHC chose to follow the requirement for authorization and the 
authorization was granted. It is simply not the case that it was impossible to obtain the 
proper authorization. 
The Petitioner chose instead to rely on payment from one source, IHC Plus, and 
chose not to bother with Molina Health care. The existence of a primary insurer does not 
excuse the requirements for notifying Molina as a secondary insurer. The fact that 
subsequent events showed that it may not have been a good business decision for LDS 
Hospital not to follow up with Molina when it received ambiguous "verification" of 
coverage with IHC Plus on August 20, 2002 has no legal bearing on whether or not the 
requirements for coverage were followed. The Presiding Officer properly found that the 
12 
Medicaid rules and the contract between Molina and The Hospital were in full force and 
effect at the time of the last admission, that The Hospital did not comply with the 
authorization requirements therein, and that The Hospital provided no legal reason why it 
should not be required to comply with the Medicaid rules. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah asks that the Administrative order be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this M ** day of October, 2004. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
REX W. OLSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that, on the ^ 7 day of October, 2004,1 caused to be mailed, with 
first-class postage prepaid, two true and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH to: 
Doug Turek 
The Turek Law Firm, PLLC 
25231 Grogan's Mill Road, Suite 110 
The Woodlands, Texas 77380 
U™*) LAA*i>%/~L*sM 
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ADDENDUM A 
OLENES WALKER 
Goiernor 
GAYLEF McKEACHNIE 
Lieutenant Governor 
State of Utah 
Utah Department 
of Health 
Scott D Williams, M D , M P H 
Executive Director 
A Richard Melton, Dr P H 
Deputy Director 
Allen Korhonen 
Deputy Director 
Michael J Deily 
Division Director 
division of Health Care Financing 
IHC HEALTH PLANS (PITTMAN) 
Petitioner 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Case No. 03-224-22 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU 
WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS 
DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT 
REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO 
IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576. 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and 
Department of Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care 
Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, 
Recipients, and Providers." 
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No. 03-224-22 in its entirety. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may 
file a written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care 
Financing. Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which 
relief is requested. The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review. 
.Utah 
Department 
of Health 
Promote Prevent Protect 
288 North 1460 West • Salt Lake City, UT 84114-3101 
Mailing Address P O Box 143101, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-3101 
Telephone (801) 538-6406 * Facsimile (801) 538-6099 * www health utah gov 
Utah! 
Wliere ideas connect" 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within 
thirty (30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for 
reconsideration is filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for 
reconsideration. The petition shall be served upon the Director of Health Care 
Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon which review is sought. Failure to 
file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may constitute a waiver of any right to 
appeal the Final Agency Order. 
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last 
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
JI DATED this b day of May 2004 
Michael Deily, Director 
Division of Health Cjtre Financin 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HE 
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
IHC HEALTH PLANS (PITTMAN) : 
Petitioner, 
vs. RECOMMENDED DECISION 
: Case No. 03-224-22 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Margaret J. Clark 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE : Administrative Law Judge 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. : 
Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R410-14, and 26, Chapter 18, and Title 63, Chapter 46b, a 
telephonic prehearing conference for the above-captioned case was held on September 2, 2003. 
Participating were: Douglas Turek, Attorney for LDS Hospital; Darlene Bensen, Barbara 
Christensen, and Craig Devashrayee for the Division of Health Care Financing; and Margie 
Rogers, and Shauna Abbatiello for Molina Healthcare of Utah. A second in-person prehearing 
was held on January 5, 2004 with Darlene Bensen, Barbara Christensen, Craig Devashrayee 
present for the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF); Margie Rogers, and Shauna 
Abbattielo for Molina Health Care; and Emily Fisher for LDS Hospital. DHCF was represented 
by Rex W. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General. Douglas Turek, Attorney for LDS Hospital, 
participated by telephone. 
Since there were no disputed issues of material facts, a Recommended Decision is hereby issued 
without a hearing based upon the parties' pleadings, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R410-
14-4. 
A Recommended Decision was submitted to Michael Deily, Director of Health Care Financing, 
on February 11, 2004. Mr. Deily issued an Interim Remand Order asking the parties to brief the 
timeliness issue raised by Mr. Turek in his letter dated March 18. 2004. Mr. Deily has directed 
this presiding officer to issue a recommended decision, sinking the untimely information 
submitted by DHCF and issuing a decision based upon the remaining admissible evidence. 
BACKGROUND 
Keyontae Pittman was born on July 22, 2002, with complications. The treatment of Keyontae 
was in five stages: 
1. July 22, through July 26, 2002, at LDS Hospital (LDSH); 
2. July 26, 2002, through July 30, 2002, at Primary Children's Medical Center (PCMC); 
3. July 30, 2002, through August 14, 2002, at LDSH; 
4. August 14, 2002, through August 19, 2002, at PCMC; 
5. August 19, 2002, until October 29, 2002, at LDSH. 
Molina Healthcare (Molina) paid for all treatment except the last stage from August 19, 2002, 
until October 29, 2002. 
ISSUE 
WAS MOLINA CORRECT IN DENYING PAYMENT TO LDS HOSPITAL FOR KEYONTAE 
POTMAN'S HOSPITAL STAY FROM AUGUST 19, 2002, THROUGH OCTOBER 29, 2002? 
FACTS 
1. Petitioner, Baby K.P., ("the baby") was born prematurely on July 22, 2002, at LDS Hospital 
("LDSH") with serious and life-threatening medical conditions, including a hole in her heart 
(LDSH Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E). 
2. The baby was treated in five stages beginning at her birth, on July 22, 2002. The fifth stage, 
the only one for which payment is an issue, began with the baby's hospitalization at LDSH on 
August 19,2002, ending on October 29, 2002. 
3. IHC Care Plus was the mother's primary insurance through her employment with the law firm 
of Vancott, Bagley Cornwall, and McCarthy. Eligibility for IHC Plus Plans began July 1, 2002. 
4. The baby's mother added the baby to the IHC Health Plans on October 8, 2002 [see LDSH 
Exhibit D]. 
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5. The baby's mother signed an IHC Health Plans "employee change Inim n i iciolh i .'-I, .'(HI '" 
deleting the baby from IHC coverage [see LDSH Exhibit E]. 
6. Since the mother added the baby to IHC Care Plus plans within 90 days of its birth, the baby 
would have been covered for 90 days after its birth [See I DSH Exhibit C, p. 2], had it not been 
deleted. 
; On July 22, 2002, LDSH called IHC Plans (rather t! lan Molina), to determine coverage. 
LDSH was informed that the baby had not yet been added to the mother's policy and that the 
mother needed to add the baby "right away."[see Molina's Exhibit 2, a letter from Emily Fisher, 
LDSH, appealing to Molina]. 
8 LDS 11 did not coordinate with Moliina or obtain a prior authorization from Molina for the 
baby's last hospital stay. 
9. On July 17, 2003, Molina denied payment for lack of inpatient authorization for the baby's last 
admission to LDSH from August 19, 2002, until October 29, 2002. 
10. There was no dispute between the parties that, alth LII. W ^ . - • • -.-i - • • r•*< 
necessary, the admission was not urgent or emergent. 
RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I recommend that Molina's decision to deny payment for the baby's last admission to pcMC 
from August 19, 2002, until October 29, 2002 be UPHELD based upon Utah Administrative Rule 
R414-1-13, the Utah Medicaid Provider Manual Section 1, Subsections 4 and 5, and LDS's 
contract with Molina. 
REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION 
I recommend that Molina's decision to deny payment for the baby's last admission to pcMC 
from August 19, 2002, until October 29, 2002 be UPHELD based upon the fact that LDS is a 
Utah Medicaid provider. As such, the following law applies to LDSH. 
Utah Administrative Rule R414-1-13, entitled, " Provider and Client Agreements," provides in 
relevant part: 
(2) By signing a provider agreement with the Department, the provider agrees to 
follow the terms incorporated into the provider agreements, including policies and 
3 
procedures, provider manuals, Medicaid Information Bulletins, and provider 
letters. 
Pursuant to the above cited rule, LDS Hospital, as a Medicaid Provider, is bound to follow all 
Utah Medicaid policies and procedures that are contained in the Utah Medicaid Provider Manual. 
(1) Utah Medicaid Provider Manual Section 1, 4-4, states that, "Each managed 
care plan specifies that the provider must follow the plan's procedures for 
authorization in order to receive reimbursement since information as to what plan 
the client must use is available to providers; [see Molina's Exhibit 5; emphasis 
added]; 
(2) Utah Medicaid Provider Manual, Section 1, Subsection 5 [see Molina's 
Exhibit 1 (January 16, 2004 document)] states in relevant part: "VERIFYING 
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY: a Medicaid client is required to present the Medicaid 
Identification Card before each service, and every provider must verify each 
patient's eligibility, EACH TIME and BEFORE services are rendered. Providers 
must know if the client is currently eligible for Medicaid, enrolled in a managed 
care plan, Emergency Services or the Restriction Program; assigned to a Primary 
Care Provider; covered by a third party; or responsible for a co-payment or co-
insurance [emphasis added]. Eligibility and HMO enrollment may change from 
month to month. The information needed is printed on the client's Medicaid 
Identification Card at the Interim Verification of Eligibility (form 695). The 
provider may wish to copy the card to substantiate the Medicaid claim. 
Information is also available through Medicaid Online, ACCESSNOW, and 
Medicaid Information. 
The Utah Medicaid Provider Manual, Section 1, Subsection 4-4 is entitled "Managed Care Plans 
and Prior Authorization." That Section provides as follows: 
Each managed care plan specifies which services require prior authorization (PA) 
and the conditions of authorization. When a provider contacts Medicaid to request 
PA for services to a patient covered by a managed care plan, Medicaid must refer 
the provider to that plan. Medicaid cannot authorize PA requests for services for 
patients enrolled in managed care plans, unless the services are not included under 
the Medicaid contract with the plan. 
Because information as to what plan the client must use is available to providers, 
the provider must follow the plan's procedures for authorization in order to receive 
reimbursement. When the client is enrolled in a managed care plan, and Medicaid 
staff prior authorize a service in error, instead of referring the provider to the 
client's plan, Medicaid cannot pay for the service. If the provider fails to follow 
the plan's procedures for authorization, the managed care plan may also refuse to 
pay for the service [emphasis added]. 
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Section 5 of the Utah Medicaid Provider Manual, under "General Information, piu\ ides: 
A Medicaid client is required to piesent the Medicaid Identification Card before 
each service, and every provider must verify each patient's eligibility EACH 
TIME and BEFORE services are rendered. Providers must know if the client is 
currently eligible for Medicaid, enrolled in a managed care plan, Emergency 
Services or the Restriction Program, assigned to a Primary Care Provider; covered 
by a third party; or responsible for a co-payment or co-insurance [emphasis 
added]. Eligibility and HMO enrollment may change from month to month. The 
information needed is printed on the client's Medicaid identification Card or the 
Interim Verification of Eligibility (form 695)...." 
A contiacl setting forth IHCS Responsibilities [see Molina's Exhibit 6, September 3, 2003 
document], states in relevant part: "Compliance with Quality and Utilization Management 
Program; IHCHS agrees to notify AFC [now called "Molina"] of any urgent or emergent hospital 
admission by the second working day after such admission (Monday through Friday 8:00a.m. to 
5*00 p.m. Mountain Standard Time). 
Molina's Exhibit 7, (September 3, 2003 document), is a copy of an amendment, effective April 1, 
2002, adding LDSH to an agreement allowing Molina Medicaid members to assess Molina at a 
discounted rate. Under a Section, entitled, "IHCHS, RESPONSIBILITIES" paragraph G states: 
Compliance with Quality and Utilization Management Program: IHCHS agrees to 
provide clinical information as authorized by the Member to the AFC [now 
Molina] when the Member has reached an outlier status during a hospital stay. 
Outlier status is defined as the recommended average length of stay by Millman 
and Robertson, and shall apply to all EHCHS facilities. 5 IHCHS agrees to notify 
AFC of any urgent or emergent hospital admission by the second working day 
after such admission (Monday through Friday 8;00 a.m. to 5;00 p.m. Mountain 
Standard Time). A clinical review of any emergent or urgent admission will be 
provided upon request within two (2» working days of the request. The 
information in the clinical review will include: date of service, reason for 
admission, primary diagnosis, diagnostic testing, abnormal lab values and 
medication review 
LDSH contended that it "acted reasonably, considering all the facts known to it at the time." 
However, even excluding the untimely evidence that LDSH"s own admission records indicate it 
knew from July 22, 2002, that the baby's secondary coverage was Utah Medicaid through 
Molina, the Utah Administrative Code, the Utah Medicaid Provider Manual and LDSH.'s 
contract with Molina require that providers take the responsibility of verifying the client's 
coverage each time and before services are rendered, following whatever requirements are 
applicable to that particular plan. 
In Primary Children's Hospital (Daugaard) v Utah Department of Health, 993 P.2d 882 (Utah 
5 
Ct. App.1999) the petitioner hospital discovered that the database of Respondent Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing, (the Medicaid agency), indicated that the petitioner 
patient was no longer eligible for Medicaid. Because of this, the petitioner did not submit a 
request for prior authorization. The petitioner hospital, not knowing that respondent had resumed 
the petitioner patient's coverage later in the day, performed a bone marrow transplant and 
requested a retroactive prior authorization. DHCF denied the request and petitioners appealed. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision because: (1) it determined that based upon prior 
practice with DHCF, the provider had never been required to request a prior authorization when 
DHCF's system showed no eligibility; (2) a section of the administrative rule for transplants 
authorized retroactive prior authorizations for unusual circumstances, which the court determined 
were met; and (3) because DHCF advised the provider who relied upon it to its detriment, that the 
patient's Medicaid eligibility had lapsed when in fact it had not. 
The present case is distinguishable from the Primary Children's Hospital/Daugaard because there 
is no estoppel issue. Neither DHCF nor Molina did anything to mislead LDSH. 
Furthermore, the law is clear. A contrary decision would have the effect of nullifying R414-1-13, 
the Utah Medicaid Provider Manual, and the contract between LDSH and Molina for a reduced 
cost of care for LDSH. The contract between LDSH and Molina was an arm's length transaction 
between two sophisticated parties and should be upheld. 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
I recommend that Molina Healthcare of Utah's decision be UPHELD. 
RIGHT TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision and a 
Final Agency Action, which represent the results of that review, will be released simultaneously 
by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. 
DATED this $f day of April 2004 
I Mftfgaren. Clark 
Administrative Law Judge 
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ADDENDUM R 
UII Brief of the appellan '. I h :: I. n i 2I c It the ; .ppellant shall con ttaii t. 111 icier appropriate headings 
a,wi in f|ie order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment 
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the 
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears 
immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents , including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(4) A brief s tatement showing the jurisdict ion of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented foi 1 evie 0 % 11 1 :h icii.i ig for each issi IC: tl ic standai d • .: I! 
appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 111 the trial 
court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out 
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth "< »" addendum to the brief under 
paragraph (1 1) of this rule. 
0(7) .1 statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, 
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant 
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) 
of this mle. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a 
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a 
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
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(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
(a)(lO) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)( l l ) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief 
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited 
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in 
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as 
part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or 
document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the 
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant 
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new 
matter set forth in the opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed 
except with leave of the appellate court. 
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fil) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and <>M1 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant'' ; ;J 
"appellee " It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency 
proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
inj tired person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original 
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of 
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of 
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered 
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to 
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility 
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which (he 
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(I) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of 
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions 
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, 
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a 
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless 
the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not 
exceed 50 pages in length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and 
shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer 
to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response 
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 
25 pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not to exceed 25 
pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's answers to the original issues 
raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive 
of table of contents, table of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of 
the court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than 
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one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of 
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of 
the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant authorities come to 
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed or after oral argument but before 
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the 
citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals Theie shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall 
without argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations Any response shall be made 
within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited 
(j) Requirements and sanctions All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with 
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, 
immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the 
offending lawyer 
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ADDENDUM ( 
U t a h M e d i c a i d P r o v i d e r M a n u a l j GENERAL INFORMATION 
Div ls fo r ro f Health Care F inanc ing I Page Updated January 2002 
Mental Health Servic«$ 
.11 most areas of the state, Medicaid covers outpatient and inpatient pnentai health services ONLY when provided 
through a Prepaid Mental Health Plan, Medicaid clients who live in certain counties of the state must receive ail 
mental health services from community mental health centers which have contracted with the Medicaid aaencv as a 
Prepaid Mental Health Plan (PMHP), 
Physicians or psychologists treating individuals who may become: eligible for Medicaid should contact the 
appropriate Prepaid Mental Health Plan to ensure payment or arrange for the patient to be transferred to the 
contracting mental health center for continued services. Even if the individual is not yet enrolled with a PMHP, he or 
she may be entitled to retroactive Medicaid eligibility. (See Chapter ;1 - 3, Retroactive Medicaid), and the PMHP 
contractor will be responsible for services. A list of Prepaid Mental Health Plans by county and telephone numbers 
is provided in the GENERAL ATTACHMENTS section of the Utah Medicaid Provider Manual. 
Other Managed Care Plans 
Effective for dates of service on or after September 1, 1997; chiropractic providers must contact the Chiropractic 
Health Plan (CHP) directly for details of provider participation, claim submission, payments and requests for prior 
authorization. All chiropractic services are covered by a capitated reimbursement contract with CHP. 
4 a n a g e d C a f i e p j a f l s 3 ^ Prj0r Authorization 
Each managed care plan specifies which services require prior authorization (PA) and the conditions for authorization. 
When a provider contacts Medicaid to request PA for services to a patiejnt covered by a managed care plan, Medicaid 
must refer the provider to that plan. Medicaid cannot authorize PA requests for services for patients enrolled in 
managed care plans, unless the services are not included under the Medicaid contract with the plan. 
Because information as to what plan the client must use is available tolproviders, the provider must follow the plai13 
procedures for authorization in order to receive reimbursement When! the client is enrolled in a managed care plan, 
and Medicaid staff prior authorize a service in error, instead of referring the provider to the client's plan, Medicaid 
cannot pay forthe service. If the provider fails to follow the plan's procedures for authorization, the managed care plan 
may also refuse to pay for the service. 
SECTION 1 v/ ,/vw.health.3tate.ut.us/medicaid/S£CTlQNl,pc!f page 15 of 60 
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5 VERIFYING MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY 
A Medicaid client is required to present the Medicaid Identification Card before each service, and every provider must 
verify each patient's eligibility EACH TIME and BEFORE services are rendered Providers must know if the client is 
currently eligible for Medicaid, enrolled in a managed care plan, Emergency Services or the Restriction Program, 
assigned to a Primary Care Provider, covered by a third party, or responsible for a co-payment or co-insurance 
Eligibility and HMO enrollment may change from month to month The information needed is printed on the client's 
Medicaid Identification Card or the Interim Verification of Eligibility (Form 695) The provider may wish to copy the card 
to substantiate the Medicaid claim 
Information is also available through Medicaid Online, ACCESSNOW and Medicaid Information (Refer to Chapter 
12, Medicaid Information ) Explanation of the information required for Medicaid and how to access that information 
is given in the sub-chapters which follow 
NOTE 1 Medicaid staff make every effort to provide complete and accutate information on all inquiries However, 
federal regulations do not allow a claim will not be paid even if the information given to a provider by Medicaid staff 
was incorrect 
NOTE 2 Temporary Proof of Eligibility 
When a temporary proof of eligibility expires, Medicaid will no longer pay claims, unless the client has since been 
issued a Medicaid Identification Card for the month of service Two temporary proofs of eligibility are the Baby Your 
Baby Card and the Interim Verification of Eligibility (Form 695) 
- When a client's Medicaid Identification number ends with the letter V , the client is eligible ONLY for the Baby 
Your Baby Program ALWAYS require the Baby Your Baby Card and check the dates of eligibility Refer to 
Chapter 1 3 - 1 , Presumptive Eligibility Program (Baby Your Babv) 
- When a client's Medicaid Identification number ends with the letter *X\ the client has an Interim Venfication 
of Eligibility (Form 695) Refer to Chapter 5 - 2, Interim Verification of Medicaid Eligibility (Form 695) 
5 - 1 Medicaid Identification Card 
Each family or individual eligible for Medicaid receives a Medicaid Identification Card each month The card is typically 
received on the first of the month It lists the following information 
the month of eligibility 
* any limitation of benefits, such as Emergency Services Only 
the name of each eligible individual 
the individual's ten digit Medicaid Identification number 
the individual's sex, date of birth and age 
enrollment in a managed care plan or selection of a Primary Care Provider 
co-payment or co-insurance owed, if any 
the designated Prepaid Mental Health Plan 
the designated dental provider 
the designated pharmacy provider and 
third party liability coverage 
Examples of Medicaid Identification Cards and verifications for other medical assistance programs administered by 
the Department of Health are included in the GENERAL ATTACHMENTS section of the Utah Medicaid Provider 
Manual 
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R414-1-13. Provider and Client Agreements. 
(1) To meet the requirements of 42 CFR 431.107, the Department contracts with each 
provider who furnishes services under the Utah Medicaid Program. 
(2) By signing a provider agreement with the Department, the provider agrees to follow the 
terms incorporated into the provider agreements, including policies and procedures, provider 
manuals, Medicaid Information Bulletins, and provider letters. 
(3) By signing an application for Medicaid coverage, the client agrees that the Department's 
obligation to reimburse for services is governed by contract between the Department and the 
provider. 
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